Merge branch '1.29-security'

This commit is contained in:
Miroslav Lichvar
2014-01-31 17:06:08 +01:00
7 changed files with 239 additions and 62 deletions

View File

@@ -265,11 +265,25 @@ prepare_socket(int family)
void
CAM_Initialise(int family)
{
int i;
assert(!initialised);
initialised = 1;
assert(sizeof (permissions) / sizeof (permissions[0]) == N_REQUEST_TYPES);
for (i = 0; i < N_REQUEST_TYPES; i++) {
CMD_Request r;
int command_length, padding_length;
r.version = PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER;
r.command = htons(i);
command_length = PKL_CommandLength(&r);
padding_length = PKL_CommandPaddingLength(&r);
assert(padding_length <= MAX_PADDING_LENGTH && padding_length <= command_length);
assert(command_length == 0 || command_length >= offsetof(CMD_Reply, data));
}
utoken = (unsigned long) time(NULL);
issued_tokens = returned_tokens = issue_pointer = 0;
@@ -1708,7 +1722,13 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
assert(0);
}
allowed = ADF_IsAllowed(access_auth_table, &remote_ip) || localhost;
if (!(localhost || ADF_IsAllowed(access_auth_table, &remote_ip))) {
/* The client is not allowed access, so don't waste any more time
on him. Note that localhost is always allowed access
regardless of the defined access rules - otherwise, we could
shut ourselves out completely! */
return;
}
/* Message size sanity check */
if (read_length >= offsetof(CMD_Request, data)) {
@@ -1718,13 +1738,13 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
}
if (expected_length < offsetof(CMD_Request, data) ||
read_length < offsetof(CMD_Reply, data) ||
rx_message.pkt_type != PKT_TYPE_CMD_REQUEST ||
rx_message.res1 != 0 ||
rx_message.res2 != 0) {
/* We don't know how to process anything like this */
if (allowed)
CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
return;
}
@@ -1752,15 +1772,12 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
if (!LOG_RateLimited()) {
LOG(LOGS_WARN, LOGF_CmdMon, "Read command packet with protocol version %d (expected %d) from %s:%hu", rx_message.version, PROTO_VERSION_NUMBER, UTI_IPToString(&remote_ip), remote_port);
}
if (allowed)
CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
if (rx_message.version >= PROTO_VERSION_MISMATCH_COMPAT) {
CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
if (rx_message.version >= PROTO_VERSION_MISMATCH_COMPAT_SERVER) {
tx_message.status = htons(STT_BADPKTVERSION);
/* add empty MD5 auth so older clients will not drop
the reply due to bad length */
memset(((char *)&tx_message) + PKL_ReplyLength(&tx_message), 0, 16);
transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 16);
transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 0);
}
return;
}
@@ -1769,8 +1786,8 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
if (!LOG_RateLimited()) {
LOG(LOGS_WARN, LOGF_CmdMon, "Read command packet with invalid command %d from %s:%hu", rx_command, UTI_IPToString(&remote_ip), remote_port);
}
if (allowed)
CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
tx_message.status = htons(STT_INVALID);
transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 0);
@@ -1781,32 +1798,14 @@ read_from_cmd_socket(void *anything)
if (!LOG_RateLimited()) {
LOG(LOGS_WARN, LOGF_CmdMon, "Read incorrectly sized command packet from %s:%hu", UTI_IPToString(&remote_ip), remote_port);
}
if (allowed)
CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
CLG_LogCommandAccess(&remote_ip, CLG_CMD_BAD_PKT, cooked_now.tv_sec);
tx_message.status = htons(STT_BADPKTLENGTH);
transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 0);
return;
}
if (!allowed) {
/* The client is not allowed access, so don't waste any more time
on him. Note that localhost is always allowed access
regardless of the defined access rules - otherwise, we could
shut ourselves out completely! */
if (!LOG_RateLimited()) {
LOG(LOGS_WARN, LOGF_CmdMon, "Command packet received from unauthorised host %s port %d",
UTI_IPToString(&remote_ip),
remote_port);
}
tx_message.status = htons(STT_NOHOSTACCESS);
transmit_reply(&tx_message, &where_from, 0);
return;
}
/* OK, we have a valid message. Now dispatch on message type and process it. */
/* Do authentication stuff and command tokens here. Well-behaved